Neville's Blake-derived statement of causation, and the bridge between two things the catalogue already holds separately. Every so-called natural effect in this world has an imaginal cause and not a natural one; a natural cause only seems - it is a delusion of our fading memory. The argument is one sentence long: our memory is so very short that we cannot connect the imaginal act to the effect we later observe, and so we deny parenthood. We cannot recognise our own harvest; we deny that we ever planted the thing we are reaping. So the natural antecedent, being the only thing still in view when the harvest arrives, is mistaken for the cause.

This stands between M259 no-other-cause (there is no cause outside your own consciousness) and M647 forgetting-how-it-was-done (the man who rises and says it would have happened anyway): it is the formula that explains WHY the secondary cause looks real, namely that forgetting is what manufactures the appearance of natural causation.

PROVENANCE: coined out of chronological sequence at the request of the attacher lane (PM 5966), which measured the formula recurring verbatim in at least 15 lectures (1204, 1216, 1474, 1530, 1783, 1831, 1861, 1939, 1971, 1972, 2148 among them) with no motif stating it. The reader's chronological read has not yet reached any of those lectures - the earliest, 1831, is about a hundred lectures ahead - so this description is written from the canonical passage alone and not from the surrounding lecture. It should be revisited and enriched when the read reaches lecture 1216 or 1831.